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Abstract
The financial sector presents many opportunities to apply various machine learning
techniques. Centralized machine learning creates a constraint which limits further
applications in finance sectors. Data privacy is a fundamental challenge for a
variety of finance and insurance applications that account on learning a model
across different sections. In this paper, we define a new practical scheme of
collaborative machine learning that one party owns data, but another party owns
labels only, and term this Asymmetrically Collaborative Machine Learning.
For this scheme, we propose a novel privacy-preserving architecture where two
parties can collaboratively train a deep learning model efficiently while preserving
the privacy of each party’s data. More specifically, we decompose the forward
propagation and backpropagation of the neural network into four different steps
and propose a novel protocol to handle information leakage in these steps. Our
extensive experiments on different datasets demonstrate not only stable training
without accuracy loss, but also more than 100 times speedup compared with the
state-of-the-art system.
1 Introduction
Machine learning makes use of algorithms to perform tasks such as prediction or classification.
Classical machine learning approaches need centralizing the training data on one machine or in a
cluster. Centralized machine learning is, by far, the most common architecture. However, it also stops
further applications in finance sectors (e.g., insurance and bank) from employing machine learning
techniques. For confidentiality reasons, these finance sectors are not able to share their data and store
it in the cloud, and thus cannot benefit from centralized machine learning with other organizations.
Data privacy is a fundamental challenge for many machine learning applications depending on
data aggregation across different entities, especially in finance sectors. The trade-off between data
privacy and learning on aggregated data creates a collaborative circumstance. Decentralized machine
learning applies to keeps data safe and ensures privacy under some conditions. A new method called
Federated Learning (or Collaborative Machine Learning) [15][19], proposed by Google, offers a way
of decentralized and confidential machine learning. By using aggregated updating parameters of
the model to train algorithms instead of raw data, federated learning empowers sectors where data
cannot be transferred to third parties for confidentiality reasons with data network effects. In fact,
federated learning plays a similar role in data parallelism based distributed machine learning. In other
words, federated learning is a kind of distributed version of deep neural networks that the data can be
partitioned and stored in multiple machines. However, federated learning is only able to transform (or
online) deep learning into horizontal parallelism, which splits the data based on the quantity of the
data, i.e., the different amount of data subset goes into the parallel computation. Thus, the learning
scheme of federated learning cannot handle the situation of vertical parallelism. Additionally, recent
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researches [21] have shown that it is possible to obtain the private training data from the publicly
shared gradients.
In this paper, we investigate a learning technique that allows two parties to collaboratively train
a model while one party (the active party) holds data and another party (the passive party) holds
the corresponding labels. We term this Asymmetrically Collaborative Machine Learning since
the learning task is based on the model that parties actively interact by sharing information and
take on asymmetric roles. Compared with federated learning and collaborative machine learning,
asymmetrically collaborative machine learning is to transform machine learning algorithms into
Vertical parallelism, which splits the data based on one or more specific internal characteristics of the
data.
Technically, for this scheme, the straightforward solution is learning on encrypted data. There are
two different ways to learn a model on encrypted data: differential privacy [6, 1] and homomorphic
encryption [2]. Differential privacy injects noise into query results to avoid inferring information
about any specific record. However, it needs careful calibration to balance privacy and model usability.
Further, private attributes still remain in plaintext, which are unacceptable for finance sectors, so
users may still have security concerns. A more promising solution comes from the recent advance in
homomorphic encryption. It allows users to encrypt data with the public key and offload computation
to the cloud (or other parties). The cloud computes on the encrypted data and generates encrypted
results. Without the secret key, the cloud simply serves as a computation platform but cannot access
any user information. But it is extremely costly in computation, thus unsuitable for high dimension
data and costly machine learning methods (e.g., deep neural networks).
In this paper, we propose a novel privacy-preserving architecture to solve the problem of how the
two parties can collaboratively train a model while one party holds data, and another party holds
the label by neural networks. Intuitively, we avoid learning on encrypted data directly. Thus we
decompose a Deep Neural Network (DNN) into two components: the ’Feature Extraction’ part and
the ’Classifier’ part. In ’Feature Extraction’ a locally unencrypted deep neural network is used to
extract more compact features from unencrypted data. In the ’Classifier,’ a shallow neural network
is used to learn a classifier on encrypted features came from the component of feature extraction.
However, such a locally unencrypted and locally encrypted deep neural network results in a new
challenge of preserving-privacy. Compared with learning on encrypted data, the ’classifier’ needs to
calculate the gradient of inputs and passes it back to the ’feature extraction’ part. Thus we also need
to avoid information leakage in the gradient, which has been proved in [21]. Furthermore, we take a
two-layer neural network as an example to decompose the forward and backward propagation into
four different steps and propose a protocol to avoid information leakage in them. Our contribution
includes:
• We define a new scheme of collaborative machine learning, called asymmetrically collabo-
rative machine learning which is promising in many real-world applications.
• We propose a novel privacy-preserving, computationally efficient, homomorphic encryption-
based backpropagation algorithm for asymmetrically collaborative machine learning.
• An extensive empirical evaluation of the proposed approach is demonstrated to show the
proposed method achieves 100 times speed-up compared with the methods based on learning
on encrypted data.
2 Related Work
Traditional encryption methods, such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [3], are extremely fast,
and allow data to be stored conveniently in encrypted form. However, it is costly and quite a challenge
to perform even simple analytics on the encrypted data (i.e. ciphertexts). For example, the cloud
server needs access to the secret key, and the owner of the data needs to download, decrypt as well as
operate on the data locally. These commonly lead to security concerns. Homomorphic Encryption
(HE) is able to encrypt data before sending to a cloud computing platform while still allowing the
operations of search, sort, and edit on the ciphertexts. This property avoids needing to ship data back
and forth to be decrypted from the cloud computing platform. HE which supports any function on
ciphertexts is known as Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [7], while Partially Homomorphic
Encryption (PHE) [4, 11] includes encryption schemes that have homomorphic properties, with
respect to one operation (e.g., only addition or only multiplication, but not both). However, FHE
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faces a fundamental problem which extremely costly in computation. Thus it is unpractical for some
machine learning methods (e.g. high dimension linear model and neural network). Paillier [16],
as well known one method of PHE, supports unlimited numbers of additions between ciphertext,
and multiplication between a ciphertext and a scalar constant. In other words, given Enc(m1)
and Enc(m2), you can not get Enc(m1) ⊗ Enc(m2). You can only get Enc(m1) ⊕ Enc(m2)
which equals Enc(m1 +m2). Given Enc(m1) and m2, you can get Enc(m1)⊗m2 which equals
Enc(m1 ·m2). But notice that m2, in this case, was not encrypted. ⊕ is the homomorphic addition
with ciphertext and ⊗ is the homomorphic multiplication between ciphertext and a scalar constant.
Enc(x) is the ciphertext of plaintext x.
GELU-Net [20] proposes a novel privacy-preserving architecture based on paillier. The main
difference between the proposed method and GELU is that GELU works under the situation that
one party In this paper, we focus on solving the privacy issue that data and labels are distributed on
different parties.
3 Methodology
3.1 Applying Neural Networks to Collaborative Machine Learning
To solve this problem, our main strategy is making a deep neural network partially learn on unen-
crypted data and partially learn on encrypted features to reduce the computation cost in the stage of
learning on encrypted data. More specifically, a deep neural network is carefully partitioned into two
parts: the ’feature extraction’ and the ’classifier’ (or ’regression’). The ’feature extraction’ plays a
role of dimension reduction in the plaintext and produces compact features to the ’classifier’. And
then the implementation of ’the classifier’ is learning a simplified model (e.g. logistic regression) on
encrypted features generated from the ’feature extraction’ part. It is easy to observe that this setting
is insensitive to the dimension of inputs and network architectures not only because the ’feature
extraction’ part contains the majority of neural network and it does not use arithmetic operations of
homomorphic encryption, but also because the computational complexity of ’classifier’ part is related
to the dimension of features generated from the ’feature extraction’ part rather than the dimension
of raw inputs and the former is far more compact. Take a two-layer neural network as an example,
one for ’feature extraction’ and another one for ’classifier’, The corresponding training objective is
shown in Eq. 1, for simplicity the bias items are omitted:
min
W1,W2
1
|D|
∑
D
Li(ti,F{W1,W2}(xi)) =
∑
D
Li(ti,Softmax(W2σ(W1xi))),xi ∈ D
(1)
where D is the dataset. xi and ti represend the input data sample and its related target (label). σ(.) is
ReLU function [9] W1 ∈ Rdh×di and W2 ∈ Rc×dh are parameters of two layers respectively. di
is the dimension of input sample. dh is the dimension of hidden layer. c is the output dimension as
the same as the number of categories. Assuming Li is CrossEncropy [14], η is learning rate, We can
further decompose forward and backward propagation into two different parts respectively, and then
there are four steps as following:
• Step 1 The forward propagation on the active party: the active party feeds the data into the
neural net (feature extraction ) on the active party. The output activations ai = σ(W1xi) ∈
Rdh is then send to the passive party.
• Step 2 The forward propagation on the passive party: the passive party propagates the
received activation ai through its neural nets pi = softmax(zi), zi = W2ai and compute
the CrossEncropy loss Li(ti,pi) = ti log(pi).
• Step 3 The back propagation on the passive party: the passive party compute the required
gradients: ∂Li∂pi = ti − pi, ∂Li∂W2 = ∂Li∂pi
∂pi
∂W2
= ∂Li∂pi ai,
∂Li
∂ai
= ∂Li∂pi
∂pi
∂ai
= ∂Li∂piW2 and
update parameter via W2 =W2 − η ∂Li∂W2 and send ∂Li∂ai back to the active party.
• Step 4 The back propagation on the active party: the active party receives the gradient ∂Li∂ai
from passives party, computes the gradient ∂Li∂W1 =
∂Li
ai
∂ai
∂W1
= ∂Li∂ai xi and updates the
parameters W1 =W1 − η ∂Li∂W1 .
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To fulfil the requirement that both data and label cannot get or infer from the other side, we encrypt
the intermediate results exchanged in both parties, and carefully design a Privacy-Preserving Back-
Propagation that is compatible with the PHE in the setting of Asymmetrically Collaborative Machine
Learning. We detail the privacy issue and the algorithm in the following section.
3.2 Secure Forward Propagation on the active party
The secure forward propagation on the active party is similar to the normal forward propagation
used in training neural nets. The only difference is that the last layer activations (outputs) ai in the
secure forward propagation needs to be encrypted with PHE. We note the additive homomorphic
encryption as [.]c Since these activations will be transmitted to the passive party, leaving them in the
plaintext will lead to the issue of information leakage. The passive party or attacker can collect these
activations as meaningfully features for later use. Potentially, the passive party or attacker may infer
the personal information from these activations. Thus, the active party will encrypt the activations to
[ai]c and then send to the passive party.
Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserved Forward Propagation
Initialization: acc, W˜2, W1
Input: learning rate η, data sample x
Active Party:
ai ← σ(W2x), [ai]c ← Enc(ai)
Send [ai]c to passive party
Passive Party:
Compute the weighted sum [z˜i]c ← W˜2
⊗
[ai]c and add random noise [z˜i + s]c ← s ⊕ [zi]c
Sent [z˜i + s]c to active party
Active Party:
z˜i + s ← Dec([z˜i + s]c)
Remove noise: zi + s ← z˜i − accai + s;
Send zi + s to the passive party
Passive Party:
Remove noise: zi ← zi + s
Compute softmax result pi = Softmax(zi)
Return pi
3.3 Secure Forward Propagation on the passive party
After receiving the encrypted activation [ai]c, the passive party keeps going forward propagation,
as shown in the step 1 of Sec 3.1 It calculates the weighted sum ([zi]c = W2
⊗
[ai]c) and applies
softmax. However, the non-linearity e[zi]c cannot be computed in the ciphertext. The solution to this
problem is transmitting the weighted sum [zi]c back to the active party for decryption and get the
plaintext zi to calculate the softmax results [20]. But directly sending the weighted sum [zi]c without
any protection will leak the prediction to the active party. The active party can use the activation
prediction pairs (ai, zi) to learn the classifier part in the passive party. In this way, the active party
can learn the weights of the model on the passive party and further approximate the label. To end this,
instead of transmitting the weighted sum [zi]c directly back to the active party, the passive party will
inject random noise to it [zi]c
⊕
s. The noise s hides the real weighted sum, which prevents the
active party from accumulating activation prediction pairs to infer the weights of the neural network
on the passive party. Finally, the active party decrypts the noisy weighted sums[zi + s]c and sends
the decrypted zi + s to the passive party. And then the passive party removes the noise injected
before and computes the prediction (softmax result).
Another problem here is that the passive party get both W2 and zi and can easily get ai via linear
regression. To end this, the passive party should use noisy weight W˜2 to calculate the weighted sum
([z˜i]c = W˜2
⊗
[ai]c) where W˜2 =W2 + acc. Note that acc is generated by the active party, we
will discuss how to inject acc to W2 in the Sec 3.4. With same procedure, the passive party still
need to add additional noise to [z˜i]c and send [z˜i + s]c back the active party to avoid computing
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Algorithm 2: Privacy-preserved Backward Propagation
Input: Prediction: pi on passive party; Target ti; The encrypted activation [ai]c;
Passive Party ;
Compute the following gradients:;
∂Li
∂pi
← ti − pi, [ ∂Li∂W2 ]c ← ∂Li∂pi
⊗
[ai]c,
∂˜Li
∂ai
← ∂Li∂pi W˜2;
Add noise [ ∂Li∂W2 + s]c ←− [ ∂Li∂W2 ]c
⊕
s ;
Send [ ∂Li∂W2 + s]c to the active party ;
Active Party ;
∂Li
∂W2
+ s ←− Dec([ ∂Li∂W2 + ]c);
Add noise: ∂˜Li∂W2 + s ←− ∂Li∂W2 + s − wη ;
Encrypt noise: [acc]c ←− Enc(acc);
Accumulate noise: acc ← acc + w;
Send ∂˜Li∂W2 + s and [acc]c to passive party.;
Passive Party ;
Remove noise: ∂˜Li∂W2 ← ∂˜Li∂W2 + s;
Update weights W˜2 ← W˜2 − η ∂˜Li∂W2 ;
Remove noise from gradients: [∂Li∂ai ]c ← ∂˜Li∂ai − [acc]c
⊗ ∂Li
∂pi
;
Send [∂Li∂ai ]c to the active party;
Active Party
∂Li
∂ai
←− Dec([∂Li∂ai ]c);
Do the normal backpropagation with ∂Li∂ai ;
non-linearity homomorphically. To perform the correct forward propagation the active party will
cancel the noise in [z˜i]c via [zi]c = [z˜i]c − accai and send [zi]c to the passive party for computing
the true softmax output pi with respect to W2. Since the passive party can only observe the noisy
W˜2 and [z]c with respect to W2. The passive party cannot infer the activation ai. The whole forward
propagation performs in a privacy-preserved manner.
3.4 Secure Backward Propagation on the passive party
During the backpropagation we need to estimate two gradient: the gradient ∂Li∂W2 and the gradient
∂Li
∂ai
. Note that these two gradients are the linear transformation of either ai or W2, both the active
party and the passive party can derive what they want via regression. Not carefully dealing with
gradient updating may cause a significant information leak. In backpropagation, the passive party
will compute the following gradients: ∂Li∂pii = ti − pi, [
∂Li
∂W2
]c =
∂Li
∂pii
⊗
[ai]c and ∂˜Li∂ai =
∂Li
∂pi
W˜2.
Note that the gradient of weights [ ∂Li∂W2 ]c is in the encrypted form. After weights updating [W2]c =
W2 − η[ ∂Li∂W2 ]c, the weights [W2]c will result in the encrypted form. This causes the issue that in
the forward propagation of the next iteration, there will be two encrypted quantities in calculating
weighted sum zi = [W2]c[ai]c, which is incompatible with PHE. To avoid this situation, the passive
party need to send the gradients of weight [ ∂Li∂W2 ]c to the active party and get the decrypted gradients
∂Li
∂W2
back. However, this solution is dangerous. Since the passive party holds ∂Li∂pii and the active
party holds the ai, knowing the gradient ∂Li∂W2 make both parties leak information at the same time.
Thus, both two parties need to add random noise to the gradients of weights before sending it to the
other side. Specifically, they do
• The passive party add noise s to [ ∂Li∂W2 ]c and send [ ∂Li∂W2 + s] to the passive party.
• the active party decrypt [ ∂Li∂W2 + s]c
5
• The active party add random noise wη : ∂˜Li∂W2 + s ← ∂Li∂W2 + s − wη
• The active party send ∂˜Li∂W2 + s to the passive party
• The passive party remove noise s: ∂˜Li∂W2 ← ∂˜Li∂W2 + s
Note that noise generated by the passive party can be removed immediately while the gradients of
weight ∂˜Li∂W2 still contain noise where
∂˜Li
∂W2
= ∂Li∂W2 − wη . With ∂˜Li∂W2 the passive party blindly update
the parameters as:
W˜t+12 =W2
t − (η ∂Li
∂W2
− w
η
)⇒ W˜t+12 =W2t − η
∂Li
∂W2
+ w ⇒ W˜t+12 =W2t+1 + w
We can see that the noise w will accumulate in weight W2 in each iteration. If we note the
accumulated noise as acc = 1w + 
2
w + . . . 
t
w, the true weights that supposed to be used in the
forward and backward propagation should be W2t+1 = W˜t+12 − acc. To perform the right forward
propagation, the active party needs to cancel the noise by subtracting aiacc from the noisy weighted
sums z˜i as described in Sec 3.3. Similar to the forward propagation, in the back propagation, the
extra noisy gradients is also added to ∂˜Li∂ai and need to be removed before backpropagating to the
active party. To achieve this, the active party needs to send the encrypted [acc]c to the passive party.
the passive party calculate the true gradient [∂Li∂ai ]c =
∂˜Li
∂ai
− [acc]c
⊗ ∂Li
∂pi
and send the encrypted
gradient [∂Li∂ai ]c to the active party.
3.5 Secure Backward propagation on the active party
The active party decrypt the gradient [∂Li∂ai ]c received from the passive party, compute the gradient
∂Li
∂W1
= ∂Liai
∂ai
∂W1
= ∂Li∂ai xi and update the parameters W1 = W1 − η ∂Li∂W1 . The whole privacy
preserved backpropagation is detailed in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
4 Experiment
To evaluate the proposed method, specifically, we determine if our model (i) achieves lossless
performance in classification tasks and (ii) if it brings advantages over other solution based on
learning on encrypted data. Please note we don’t want to highlight the performance of neural
networks but we can achieve a lossless performance. we implement the passive party and the active
party both on two PCs with CPU Core i7-6850k and 64GB RAM connected by 1Gbps LAN. The
neural network of the active party is built using pytorch [17] and the neural net of the passive party is
implemented by pure python integrated with numpy. We compare the proposed method with two
previous studies that have considered privacy-preserved training with homomorphic encryption for
deep neural networks. GELU [20] using PHE [16] and CryptoNets [8].
4.1 Setting
In order to make comparison with previous work: GELU and CryptoNets [8]. We implement the
following architecture of the proposed method:
• Multinomial Logistic Regression(MLR: Data-Dense(10)-Softmax
• Conv-1: Data-Conv(5×5, stride 2, 5 filter) -ReLu-MeanPooling-ReLu-Dense(84))-
Dense(10)-Softmax
• LeNet-5: Data-Conv(5×5, stride 1, 6 filter)-MeanPooling-ReLu-Conv(5×5, stride 1, 16
filter)-MeanPooling-ReLu-Dense(120)-Dense(84)-Dense(10)-Softmax
For the proposed method, the final layer, Dense(10)-Softmax, is on the passive party side, the rest of
layers are on the active party side.
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Figure 1: The computation speed for one inference with different input feature dimension
4.2 Training Accuracy
In this section, we show the proposed method is a lossless solution. The neural network architecture
we use is Conv-1. Due to arithmetic operations of homomorphic encryption only support multiplica-
tion and addition, CryptoNets uses the square function to avoid computing the non-linear activation.
However, this makes the training unstable and damage to the accuracy [8]. From the Table. 1, we can
see that CryptoNets suffers an accuracy loss ranging from 2% to 5% compared with the proposed
method. We also note that GELU is also a lossless solution. This is because GELU adopts the similar
round trip strategy that sending activation back and forth between the passive party and the active
party for handling non-linear operation as we do.
Table 1: Test accuracy of different Architecture
Architecture GELU CryptoNets Ours
Iris 0.982 0.966 0.980
Diabetes 0.758 0.741 0.760
kr-vs-kp 0.967 0.948 0.965
MNIST 0.969 0.919 0.970
4.3 Computation Speed
As above mentioned, the dimension of inputs and the neural network architecture are key factors to
other methods. In this section we will demonstrate that the proposed method is insensitive to these
two factors.
Sensitivity of Input Dimension One problem of learning on the encrypted data is the computation
speed depend on the input dimension. It is because the dimension of the encrypted data directly in-
creases the number of homomorphic encryption operations. We compare our model with multinomial
logistic regression that learned on encrypted data. We experiment with simulated data with various
feature lengths. As shown in Fig. 1, our proposed method is insensitive to the dimensions of input
data compared with multinomial logistic regression (i.e., shallow network with softmax activation).
We do the experiment on the real word data using MNIST [13] and CIFAR-10 [12]. We can observe
from the table. 2 the result of CIFAR-10 [12] (dimensions is 3× 32× 32) is very similar to the result
on MNIST [13] (dimensions is 1× 28× 28). This benefits from we employ learning on encrypted
features generated from the ’feature extraction’ of the deep neural network, which can significantly
reduce raw data dimensions. Compared with learning on encrypted data, feature extraction is very
efficient. So that is why the proposed method consumes similar time in the different datasets.
Sensitivity of Neural Network Architectures Note that the proposed method is designed to work
on any architecture without much computation speed degrade. In comparison, the other baselines
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Table 2: Time for different architectures on MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset
Archiecture Time(s)
Multinomial Logistic Regression (MNIST) 0.5887
Multinomial Logistic Regression (CIFAR-10) 2.7027
LeNet-5 (MNIST) 0.0583
LeNet-5 (CIFAR-10) 0.0592
models like GELU and CryptoNet are sensitive to either the neural networks architecture or input data
dimension. Thus, using complex neural net such as VGG [18], ResNet [10] with high dimension input
such as ImageNet [5] is infeasible to the methods of learning on encrypted data, and it will take an
extremely long time. Moreover, since the arithmetic operations in PHE is much faster than arithmetic
operations in FHE. We mainly focus on comparing the proposed method with GELU. Thus, to make
a fair comparison, we train the proposed method and GELU on different architecture described in
Sec. 4.1. We report the computation time (for one inference). Table.3 shows the computation time
Table 3: Test accuracy of different Architectures
Architecture Time(s) Accuracy
GELU-Net(LeNet-5) 7.855 0.989
Multinomial Logistic Regression 0.588 0.93
Our Method(LeNet-5) 0.0583 0.99
Table 4: Time for the proposed method and GELU-Net on MNIST
Archiecture Time(s)
GELU-Net(Conv-1) 3.8437
Our Method (Conv-1) 0.0582
Our Method(LeNet-5) 0.0583
(for one inference) and the accuracy on MNIST [13]. We observe that the proposed method achieves
more than 100x speed-up over GELU-Net with no accuracy loss. Even compared with simpler
architecture multinomial logistic regression (MLR), our method is much faster. Therefore our method
works much faster than GELU and performs much better than the linear model with encrypted data
due to the deep neural network can learning more semantic represendation for targets. Table. 4
shows the computation speed of the proposed method in both deep (LeNet-5) and shallow neural net
(Conv-1). Result reveals that the time for one inference is almost invariant to the architectures as
long as the output dimension is the same (both Conv-1 and LeNet-5 are 84). That means the mainly
computational bottleneck is on the ’classifier’ which learns the part model on encrypted data. It also
shows that our deep model is highly potential to apply to more complicated data which need the
deeper neural network.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a scheme, called asymmetrically collaborative machine learning
where one party has data, but the other party has labels only. A deep neural network with a partly
unencrypted and partly encrypted strategy is proposed to avoid learning on encrypted data directly
for this scheme. Beyond that, we offer a series of solutions to preserve privacy from both parties
involved. The design has ensured the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed method. We have
carried out extensive experiments that demonstrate more than 100× times speedup compared with
the state-of-the-art solutions.
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